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Abstract 
This paper documents the maximum theoretical excess return on the market to 3.8% monthly from 
momentum  trading  in Norway and estimates the economical excess return to be marginally higher 
than 1% per month when accounting for microstructure  influences. We find that the excess returns 
of various momentum strategies are not explained by systematic  risk or exposure  to other  factors 
such as size or book‐to‐market value. We uncover a positive correlation between types of  investor 
and  the  degree  of momentum  in  the market.  Studying  business  cycles  has  provided  evidence  of 
reversals following bust periods which are in‐line with behavioral theories of overreaction. 
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1. Introduction 
Can historic observations of a publically traded company’s performance be used to predict 
their future performance? That question is the essence of this paper and there are several ways 
of answering it; for example one could look at various performance measures such as earnings 
or stock prices. We have chosen to work with the latter, or more specifically, we are 
examining whether there is a tendency for stock returns to trend in the same direction and 
thereby establish whether there is momentum in the stock market. We test whether or not it is 
possible to earn abnormal returns on the Oslo Stock Exchange by forming winner and loser 
portfolios on the basis of past stock returns.  
 
Empirical evidence from vast research in several markets document this anomaly known as 
momentum. A recent London Business School research with 108 years of data covering about 
85% of the world equity market capitalization concluded that “The momentum effect, both in 
the UK and globally, has been pervasive and persistent” (Dimson, Marsh and Staunton, 2008). 
Rouwenhorst (1998) finds in a study of 12 European countries including Norway in the period 
from 1978 to 1996 that an internationally diversified momentum portfolio earns about 1% 
excess return on the market per month.  
 
Much of the research on momentum has been dedicated to trying to explain the excess return 
earned from following such a strategy by adjusting for various factors such as the size effect, 
book-to-market ratios and market risk. During the last 25 years, attempting to explain investor 
behavior has also gained a lot of attention in trying to explain the momentum effect. 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) find that excess returns from following momentum strategies 
are not due to systematic risk or to delayed stock price reactions to common factors such as 
the January effect. Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) also present evidence which supports the 
prediction of behavioral finance models that suggest that the momentum effect is due to 
overreactions in the market. Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) analyze different investor groups 
and find that the degree of momentum behavior seems to be strongly correlated to the degree 
of sophistication of the investor types. 
 
Kloster-Jensen (2005) finds that a momentum strategy on the Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE) 
yields significant positive returns, but this is due to a large extent by compensation for taking 
on added systematic risk. Hence, he concluded that there is no momentum effect in the 
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Norwegian market. Conversely, Myklebust (2007) examines sixteen different time-strategies 
for momentum trading on the Oslo Stock Exchange and finds that all strategies yielded 
positive excess returns, which could not be explained by market risk or the size effect. 
 
Up until now OSE momentum research has been limited to using data samples of stocks that 
have been traded during the whole sample periods. This has narrowed the data sets to about 
70 stocks which can be compared to the actual number of almost 600 stocks that have been 
listed during the last eleven years, which is the time period we examine. Our approach is 
different; and by analyzing a dataset of 598 stocks we can provide evidence of the maximum 
theoretical excess return that can be earned from a momentum strategy on the OSE.  This is 
accomplished by 16 different time-strategies that are comprised of a forming period (ranking 
period of the stocks) and a holding period. These strategies are evaluated by accounting for 
risk exposure, or more precisely systematic risk (CAPM) and the size effect using a two-
factor regression model.  
 
The total dataset is then screened based on a set of rules that provides us with 123 stocks 
suitable for evaluating the maximum economic excess return that can be earned (i.e. a dataset 
that gives us the opportunity to test the momentum strategy when accounting for 
microstructure influences such as transaction costs). In this part of the study we explore one 
time-strategy, which we call “the best strategy portfolio”. 
 
As with many of our predecessors, we attempt to explain excess return by accounting for 
various factors; here we expand the model to include a third factor: book-to market ratio, 
using the Fama and French three factor model. 
 
We also probe areas that have not been explored in earlier momentum research for the 
Norwegian stock market. We test for seasonality by deducting and secluding January returns. 
Through descriptive studies of the dataset we highlight any under or over-representation 
among sectors in the momentum portfolios and provide intuitive explanations to why some 
sectors are biased towards either the loser portfolio or the winner portfolio. Moreover, we 
examine the momentum returns throughout business cycles to identify any variations in good 
times and bad times.  
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Finally, we expand the discussion of momentum explanations by building on Grinblatt and 
Keloharju’s 2000 research on the behavior of different investor types. We find that there has 
been a development over time in the type of investors that are active on the Oslo Stock 
Exchange and we examine whether this could be correlated to an increase (or a decrease) in 
the momentum effect over time.  
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2. Background information 
Anomalies such as the momentum effect and mean reversal are empirical results that do not 
appear to be consistent with traditional theories of asset-pricing behavior. According to Fama 
(1991), these anomalies indicate either market inefficiency (opportunities to earn abnormal 
return) or inadequacies in the underlying asset-pricing model. In other words, in order to 
determine whether markets are efficient or not, we need an accurate model of market 
equilibrium, this is referred to as the Joint Hypothesis problem which we will discuss in 
chapter 3. Assuming a perfect model of market equilibrium, the question is whether or not 
markets are efficient; if markets are not efficient in the weak form, which according to Fama 
(1970) means that “stock prices already reflect all information in historic price- and 
turnoverdata” it is possible to earn abnormal returns from picking stocks based on historical 
returns. In chapter four of this thesis we will look at previous research of strategies that try to 
exploit this market failure such as momentum and mean reversal strategies. We also 
investigate various explanations besides the underlying model of market equilibrium for the 
momentum effect which imply that markets are not truly inefficient even though we find 
evidence of the momentum effect. For example, whether or not the excess returns of 
momentum strategies are due to inefficient markets or just a compensation for added risk.  
 
2.1 Momentum and Mean reversals, weak­form tests 
Many previous tests of efficient markets, including Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), on we base 
much of our work, were tests of the weak form. These tests were attempting to ascertain 
whether investors could earn abnormal returns by studying past returns given an accurate 
model of market equilibrium.  
 
2.1.1 Short horizons (momentum) 
One of the most recognized market imperfections in stock returns is momentum. This refers to 
a continuing tendency of stock prices to move in one direction. When testing for the 
momentum effect, one is actually measuring the serial correlation of stock market return. In 
other words, we test whether today’s return is related to past returns. Jegadeesh and Titman 
(1993) found in a study of stock price behaviour a momentum effect in which stocks that 
performed well during the last three to twelve months continued to do so for the following 
three to twelve months. Conversely the recent performance of the worst achieving stocks for 
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the same horizons also continued over time. They concluded that while the performance of 
individual stocks is highly unpredictable, portfolios with the 10-15% best performing stocks 
in the recent past appears to outperform other portfolios. 
 
2.1.2 Long horizons (mean reversion) 
We have two types of serial correlation: positive and negative. Positive implies that past 
positive returns are followed by future positive returns and momentum in the market occurs. 
Negative serial correlation means that past positive returns are followed by future negative 
returns which are referred to as reversal. As above mentioned, studies of Jegadeesh and 
Titman (1993) and also Fama and French (1988) among others, have found evidence of 
momentum returns in stock market prices in short horizons. Whereas on longer horizons, they 
have found evidence of reversal. DeBondt and Thaler (1985) also found evidence of negative 
serial correlation in the performance of the market on longer horizons of three to five years. 
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3. Explanations for the momentum effect 
Previous studies have found evidence for a momentum effect on short horizons, from one to 
twelve months, and for mean reversion on longer time horizons. Does this mean that markets 
are really inefficient or is there another explanation for the momentum effect? The sources of 
the momentum effect are hotly debated, yet scholars have thus far not come to an agreement. 
In this chapter of the thesis, we will touch on a few explanations which will later be applied to 
our own method. Some mean that these results prove that markets are not efficient in the weak 
form since the presence of momentum indicates that stock prices are predictable. While 
certain researchers believe that markets are efficient and that the momentum effect is just due 
to inadequacies in the underlying asset-pricing model, a product of data mining or a 
compensation for risk. Others argue that transaction costs explain momentum or that 
anomalies such as the January effect may participate in explaining momentum. Off course 
then we still need to explain these anomalies in order to judge whether markets are efficient or 
not.  
 
Scholars who believe that markets are truly inefficient are leaning more towards the concept 
of behavioral finance (which for the last 25 years has become more and more prominent) as 
an explanation for the momentum effect. Hong and Stein (1997) for example, present 
behavioural models that are based on the idea that momentum profits arise due to biases that 
affect the way people interpret information. This implies that there is no rational explanation 
for the momentum effect and that markets are inefficient. 
 
3.1 Sources of momentum profits 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) analyze the sources to why a momentum strategy yields excess 
return. They decompose the momentum profits into two components relating to systematic 
risk and a third component relating to idiosyncratic risk. It is important to determine whether 
the sources of excess return is related to the first two systematic risk components or the third 
component relating to idiosyncratic risk to determine whether markets are efficient or not. If 
the profit from following a momentum strategy is due to the first two components, the profits 
do not necessarily imply that markets are inefficient since it may only be a compensation for 
taking on risk. On the other hand, if the excess returns are due to the third idiosyncratic 
component, then the excess return would imply market inefficiency.  
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The following representation of momentum strategies is derived from Jegadeesh and Titman’s 
(1993) work “Returns to buying winners and selling losers” based on that in Jegadeesh (1987) 
and Lo and MacKinlay (1990). 
 
A stocks return is described as 
࢘࢏࢚ ൌ  ࣆ࢏ ൅ ࢈࢏ࢌ࢚ ൅ ࢋ࢏࢚  
 
Where ݎ௜௧ is the return on stock i at time t and ߤ௜ is the unconditional expected return on stock 
i. The second term ܾ௜ is the factor sensitivity of stock i which is multiplied with  ௧݂ the 
unexpected return on the factor portfolio, while the last term ݁௜௧ is the firm specific 
component of return. 
 
The excess return of a momentum strategy implies that stocks that have done well in the past 
continue to perform well in the subsequent periods. This implies that: 
ࡱሺ࢘࢏࢚ െ ࢘ത࢚|࢘࢏࢚ି૚ െ ࢘ത࢚ି૚ ൐ 0ሻ ൐ 0 
 
And 
ࡱሺ࢘࢏࢚ െ ࢘ത࢚|࢘࢏࢚ି૚ െ ࢘ത࢚ି૚ ൏ 0ሻ ൏ 0 
 
Where  ݎҧ௧ is the cross sectional average return. So, we have a momentum effect if the return 
of stock i minus the markets average return is positive given that past returns of the stock i is 
bigger than the past market average return. Or vice versa if the return of a stock i minus the 
markets average return is negative given that past returns of the stock i is smaller than the past 
market average return,  
ࡱሼሺ࢘࢏࢚ െ ࢘ത࢚ሻሺ࢘࢏࢚ି૚ െ ࢘ത࢚ି૚ሻሽ ൐ 0 
 
The equation above shows the profit for a momentum strategy; where one buy stocks that in 
the past have performed better than average, and sells stocks that have performed below 
average.  
 
The equation above can be decomposed into three different terms given the one factor model 
described above: 
ࡱሼሺ࢘࢏࢚ െ ࢘ത࢚ሻሺ࢘࢏࢚ି૚ െ ࢘ത࢚ି૚ሻሽ ൌ  ࣌ࣆ૛ ൅ ࣌࢈
૛࡯࢕࢜ሺࢌ࢚, ࢌ࢚ି૚ሻ ൅ ࡯࢕࢜തതതതതത࢏ሺࢋ࢏࢚, ࢋ࢏࢚ି૚ሻ 
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Where ߪఓଶ and ߪ௕ଶ is the variance of expected returns and factor sensitivities respectively. 
The first term denotes the variance in expected returns; if the differences in expected returns 
between stocks are high the returns of momentum strategies will be higher. This is because a 
momentum strategy will tend to pick stocks with a large expected return. Hence, the larger the 
first term, the larger the expected return from following a relative strength strategy. 
 
The second part of the equation is related to the potential to time the factor. If the factor 
portfolio returns experience positive serial correlation, our strategy will pick stocks with high 
betas. While the last term is the average serial covariance of the idiosyncratic components of 
security returns, in other words the firm specific risk.  
 
To determine whether or not the excess returns of momentum strategies are due to inefficient 
markets or just a compensation for risk, it is important to determine the sources of profits. If 
our excess returns are due to one of the first two terms, we cannot conclude that markets are 
inefficient; the excess returns may just be attributed to bearing systematic risk. If on the other 
hand excess returns are due to the last term, then the excess return can imply market 
inefficiency, given the traditional theories that stipulate that unsystematic risk can be 
diversified away and therefore does not add to the expected return. If this term is negative, it 
will imply that stock prices overreact to firm-specific information and correct the overreaction 
in the following period hence it will contribute to mean reversal profits. If the last term is 
positive, it will imply that stock prices underreact to firm-specific information which will 
increase momentum profits. This is in line with our behavioral finance theory below.  
 
3.2 Behavioural finance  
Since the 1980s, the academic dominance of efficient markets has become far less common. 
Economists began to believe that stock prices are at least to some extent possible to predict. A 
new kind of economist emphasizes behavioral elements of stock-price determination, and has 
come to believe that future stock prices are somewhat predictable on the basis of past stock 
price patterns (Malkiel 2003). 
 
Hens and Bachmann (2007) argue that investors overreact to new information as a 
consequence of the availability bias which is a tendency of individuals to judge the relevance 
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of information based on how easy it is to recall. This situation where individuals tend to react 
more than correct take place for example when the price of a firm’s stock inflates in response 
to good news and later the price corrects in the opposite direction without any additional 
information. If individuals overreact to news due to the availability bias, past winners may 
become overpriced and past losers may become underpriced. This is a signal that investors 
react too strong towards recent news - good or bad - reflected in the recent stock prices. Later, 
investors may realize that their reaction was too strong and hence the stock returns start to 
rebound. Overreaction to news explains momentum in the short run and mean reversal in the 
long run.  
 
DeBondt and Thaler find empirical evidence for this effect, in their article “Does the stock 
market overreact?” (1985), they ranked stocks listed on the New York stock exchange based 
on their return over a period of three years. Based on these rankings, they have created a 
“winner” and a “loser” portfolio with 35 stocks in each. They tracked the performance of the 
respective portfolios against a market index for three years and found that the loser portfolio 
systematically overperforms and the winner portfolio systematically underperforms.  
 
Another well known bias is the representativeness bias which according to Hens and 
Bachmann (2007) is the tendency of individuals to: 
1. Estimate probabilities in dependence of their pre-existing beliefs even if the 
conclusions are statistically invalid. 
2. Believe that small samples represent entire populations. 
 
This bias leads investors to believe that the process of returns has changed in favor for the 
better after a relatively short sequence of good returns; since one believes that the sample 
return is equal to the true population return when applying the representativeness bias. This 
bias of the investors triggers prices to become too high or too low, which may generate 
momentum in the short run and reversals in the long run: one could say that there is an 
overreaction in the market. After some time investors realize that there was an overreaction 
and stock market returns reverse. Hence, it is possible to earn abnormal returns on longer 
horizons by buying the losers and selling the winners: a so called mean reversal strategy with 
a ranking period of at least 12 months.  
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Empirical foundations for overreaction causing abnormal returns from following momentum 
strategies are weaker than empirical evidence for underreaction to cause momentum.  
 
As mentioned previously, another reason for momentum strategies to earn abnormal returns is 
underreaction. Underreaction can, according to Hens and Bachmann (2007), be explained by 
Anchoring and Conservatism. Anchoring is a phenomenon that occurs when people tend to be 
overly influenced in their assessment of some amount by random amounts mentioned in the 
statement of the problem.  The anchoring heuristic may lead to underreaction if people use the 
initial or current value and underweight new information. Conservatism can be seen as a 
consequence of anchoring upon an initial probability estimate. High costs of processing new 
information can be an explanation of conservatism. Information that is either presented in a 
statistical form or abstract in nature may cause investors to revise their beliefs insufficiently in 
accordance with new information. Momentum should therefore be stronger when news 
influencing the stock’s value is difficult to analyze. There is empirical evidence supporting 
this belief. Momentum is stronger in stocks that are hard to value, such as young firms and 
small firms stocks that are not frequently analyzed. Momentum will also be stronger when 
news is presented over a longer period than when news arrives at the same time and the 
consequences are apparent. If individuals behave this way, prices will probably adjust slowly 
to information, and once the information is fully included in prices, there is no further 
predictability in stock returns. This explanation suggests that the returns in the periods after 
the holding period will be nothing.  
  
If initial values, called “anchors”, influence the investors’ expectations then stock prices will 
need some time to fully reflect this new information. Hence stocks with positive surprises will 
earn abnormally high returns while stocks with negative surprises will earn abnormally low 
returns in the months following an announcement. Such information, for example earnings 
releases can produce a phenomenon called Post- Earnings- announcement Drift (PEAD). 
According to Bernard and Thomas (1989 and 1990) stocks with positive earnings surprises 
earn abnormally high return in the months after the announcement and stocks with negative 
earnings surprises earn abnormally low return in the following months after the 
announcement. Empirical evidence of this is found by Bernard and Thomas (1990) when they 
study about 85000 quarterly earnings announcements over the period from 1974 to 1986. 
Each calendar quarter they rank stocks based on the unexpected earnings report and build ten 
portfolios. Over the following 60 trading days, a long position in the top portfolio (with firms 
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reporting positive earnings surprises) and a short position in the bottom one (with firms 
reporting negative earnings surprises) yields an abnormal return of 4.2% or about 18% on an 
annualized basis. After extending the holding period to 180 days, the difference between the 
return of the top and the bottom portfolio becomes 7.75%. 
 
Typically, the PEAD lasts one year, after that there are no earnings surprises, hence the 
earnings fall below the analysts’ expectations, which is a signal that the underreaction effect is 
over and it is time to sell the stock. 
 
To explain underreaction and overreaction, Hong and Stein (1997) model a market populated 
by two groups of rational agents. They name the two respective groups “news watchers” and 
“momentum traders”. The news watchers’ create their strategies based on private information, 
but do not extract other news watchers information from prices. The information the news 
watchers have is only partially reflected in the price when news is announced and prices 
underreact in the short run. The underreaction means that “the momentum traders” can earn 
momentum profits by trend chasing. This part of the model explains underreaction that leads 
to momentum profit, while overreaction is explained by the “momentum traders”, attempts to 
profit on trends which inevitably must lead to overreaction at long horizons. 
 
Summed, up the underreaction explanation suggests that the returns in the periods after the 
holding period will be nothing, while overreaction suggests that returns in the period after the 
holding period will reverse. We will use this insight to attempt to determine the reason for the 
momentum effect later in our paper. 
 
3.3 The Joint­hypothesis problem  
Fama demonstrated that the notion of market efficiency could not be rejected without an 
accompanying rejection of the model of market equilibrium. This concept, known as the 
"Joint-Hypothesis problem" has continually vexed researchers. 
 
Although ambiguity about information and transaction costs makes it more difficult to 
determine whether a market is efficient or not, the Joint-Hypothesis problem creates an even 
bigger problem when one is trying to determine whether a market is efficient. Fama (1991) 
argues that market efficiency is not testable unless one has an accurate equilibrium model. In 
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other words, market efficiency must be tested jointly with a model of equilibrium: an asset 
pricing model. The point here is that if there is evidence of anomalous behaviour in returns, 
(which makes the market appear inefficient), this should actually be split between market 
inefficiency and a bad model of market equilibrium. The Joint-Hypothesis stipulates that one 
can never reject efficient markets. 
 
Tests of market efficiency therefore imply that we have as a foundation for our research a 
accurate model of market equilibrium. Common models are the CAPM (the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model) and Fama and French’s Three Factor Model, in this paper we use both models. 
The CAPM has a few shortcomings; first, it assumes that asset returns are normally 
distributed random variables, also it assumes that variance is an adequate measurement of 
risk. The CAPM does not take into account the effect of behavioural finance. Since it is 
frequently observed that markets are not normally distributed, this model does not seem to be 
as accurate as it was once considered 40 years ago. Fama and French (1992) developed a three 
factor model which is more complicated than the CAPM; risk is determined by the sensitivity 
of a stock to the overall market, to a portfolio that reflects the relative returns of small versus 
large firms and a portfolio that reflects the relative returns of firms with high versus low ratios 
of book-to-market value. This model does not seem to oversimplify the market as the CAPM 
does, and is therefore more successful in describing market behaviour. Fama and French try in 
1993 to explain momentum and long time mean reversion by utilizing this three factor model; 
they find that it explains mean reversion, but not the momentum effect.  
 
3.4 Data Mining 
Others argue that the momentum effect is a product of data mining. Jegadeesh and Titman 
(2001) argue that since stock data and computer resources are easily available and there may 
be a possibility to earn large payoffs if one is capable of creating a good predicting stock 
model, both in terms of publication fees and money management: a wide variety of strategies 
may have been tested by different individuals. It therefore may be hard to decide the 
significance of each test. This can, according to Jegadeesh and Titman, be a reason to conduct 
similar empirical tests over a wide variety of time periods and for different markets, so that 
the significance of empirical findings is not just due to coincidences.   
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3.5 Conrad and Kaul hypothesis (Risk)  
Some argue that for momentum to exist, there must be inherent biases in human behavior as 
mentioned above, while others argue that the abnormal profit from momentum strategies is 
only a premium paid for taking on excess risk. Conrad and Kaul (1998) for example, argue 
that profitability of momentum strategies could only be due to cross sectional variations in 
expected returns and not to any predictable time series variations in stock returns. They start 
with the hypothesis that stock prices follow random walks with drifts and that these drifts vary 
across stocks. Further they suggest that the differences in drifts across stocks explain the 
momentum effect. This is because this drift can be looked at as the expected return of the 
various stocks. In other words, they suggest that the higher returns of winners in the holding 
period represent their expected rates of return and therefore predict that the returns from 
following a momentum strategy will be positive in any subsequent time period. If the Conrad 
and Kaul hypothesis hold, stock prices will not reverse over longer horizons. Lo and 
MacKinlay (1990) note that stocks with high expected returns in contiguous time periods are 
expected to have high realized returns in both periods and vice versa.  When buying a stock 
with a high expected return and selling a stock with a low expected return (as one does while 
following a momentum strategy), one will then earn a profit from following this strategy as 
long as there exist differences in expected returns in the market; stocks with high expected 
return have a higher risk than stocks with a lower expected return.  
 
Conrad and Kaul (1998) conclude from analyzing several momentum strategies that these 
strategies only pick stocks with high expected returns and hence a high required rate of return. 
They further suggest that the reason for this strategy being profitable is that one buys stocks 
with high risks and sell stocks with low risks. Conrad and Kaul’s prediction is that the profits 
from the momentum strategy should be equally positive in any subsequent period due to 
exposure to risk, as opposed to our behavioral models which predict that overreaction will 
lead to long time reversal or returns equal to nothing in the period after the holding period. 
 
3.6 Other factors 
3.6.1 The Size effect 
Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) finds that there is greater momentum for smaller than larger 
firms.  Small companies have a tendency to yield higher returns than big companies on a short 
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horizon (< 1 year). This is related to risk, and is possibly just a compensation for added risk 
associated with smaller firms. Reasons include that smaller stocks may be less liquid than 
bigger stocks and hence investors demand an extra return as a compensation for bad liquidity. 
Small firms may also have less secure earnings and therefore have a larger probability of 
bankruptcy in bad times. This effect was originally discovered by Banz in 1981, who 
examined the historical performance of stocks on the New York Stock Exchange by dividing 
these stocks into ten portfolios each year according to firm size. He then finds that even when 
returns are adjusted for risk, the small firm portfolio outperforms the large firm portfolio by 
an average of 4.3% annually.   
 
From the early nineties to present day the momentum strategy has become more popular 
among institutional investors due to the empirical evidence supporting it. One might expect 
that this has diminished the difference in momentum between small and large stocks. This is 
because the trading activities of these institutions will add to the momentum effect in a larger 
extent for bigger stocks than for smaller stocks since momentum strategies demand frequent 
rebalancing and larger stocks can be traded at lower costs than smaller stocks. 
 
3.6.2 The B/M ratio 
Daniel and Titman (1999) find that momentum profit is higher when the strategy is 
implemented on growth stocks, stocks with a low book-to-market value as opposed to value 
stocks (high book-to-market value). This may be explained by introducing the overconfidence 
bias. This bias is according to Hens and Bachmann (2001) “a tendency of individuals to 
express confidence in their judgments that exceeds the accuracy of those judgments”. 
Overconfident investors overestimate their stock-picking abilities, they overestimate the 
probability that their personal assessment on the value of a particular firm is more accurate 
than the assessment of other investors. This effect is more prominent the more ambiguous the 
task at hand may be, hence the overconfidence bias hypothesis suggests that momentum is 
likely to be greater for growth stocks than value stocks since it according to Jegadeesh and 
Titman (1997) is harder to evaluate growth stocks than value stocks. Lakonish, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1994) on the other hand find that a strategy which buys value stocks, stocks with a 
high book-to-market value, were profitable on a horizon of three to five years on the NYSE in 
the period 1963 to 1990. They found that the mean reversal strategy on a longer horizon is 
affected by the book-to-market ratio as the momentum strategy is on shorter horizons.   
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3.6.3 Seasonality 
Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) find an apparent Seasonality/January effect in momentum, they 
find that the winner portfolios do better than the loser portfolios in all months but January, 
where the loser portfolios do significantly better than the winner portfolios.  
 
Some argue that this effect is to be tied to tax – loss selling at the end of the year. People sell 
off stocks which have made losses the previous months to realize their capital losses before 
the end of the tax year; these investors probably do not put their income from these sales into 
the market until January. Then this excess demand in January will create an extra demand for 
stocks which will cause an upward pressure on prices known as the Seasonality effect.   
  
Marquering (2006) shows that the Seasonality effect as an anomaly has disappeared with time, 
several other anomalies have also disappeared as they have become publically known or been 
explained by Fama and French’s Three Factor Model. The momentum effect on the other hand is 
an anomaly which has yet to be explained.  
 
3.7 Microstructure influences 
Even though we find evidence of the momentum effect, it does not necessarily imply that 
markets are inefficient due to the reasons mentioned above. There are other factors present 
that might eliminate any excess return from following a momentum trading strategy when 
accounted for. Therefore under a pragmatic and modern definition of market efficiency such 
as Jensen’s (1978) definition, a market that does not exhibit momentum when adjusting for 
microstructure influences will not be classified as inefficient.  
 
A market is efficient with respect to information set θt if it is impossible to make economic 
profits by trading on the basis of information set θt.” Jensen (1978) 
 
3.7.1 Transaction costs 
One factor that should be accounted for is transaction costs, after adjusting for such costs the 
excess return from following a momentum strategy may be eliminated.  
 
It is one thing to earn abnormal returns from following a momentum strategy without 
considering transaction costs, but in practice the return of an investment strategy can only be 
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measured after taking transaction costs into consideration. By transaction costs we mean such 
costs as bid-ask spreads, taxes and brokerage fees. These costs vary considerably and are 
different from investor to investor; therefore it is quite common not to consider transaction 
costs. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) for example do not consider transaction costs and find 
that it is profitable to follow a momentum strategy, then when Lesmond, Schill and Zhou 
(2001) review their work they find that the returns from following a momentum strategy is no 
longer statistically significant after considering transaction costs.  
 
A momentum strategy has short holding periods often less than 12 months, and is therefore 
rebalanced frequently. This will obviously incur large transaction costs. According to 
previous empirical studies, the momentum effect is more prominent in portfolios consisting of 
small stocks, which further increase transaction costs. This is due to the fact that smaller 
stocks are less liquid, and may have a considerable bid-ask spreads.  Lesmond, Schill and 
Zhou (2001) report that differences in the momentum effect across stocks may be due to 
differences in transaction costs and sometimes totally eroded by the transaction costs of 
following a momentum strategy.  
 
According to previous studies such as Hong, Lim and Stein (2000) and Jegadeesh and Titman 
(2001), most of the momentum effect is generated by the loser portfolios. To exploit this, it is 
necessary to short sell these loosing stocks, which often incur high transaction costs and is not 
necessarily possible to realize. This is because the market for shorting stocks is different from 
buying stocks since one has to borrow a stock to be able to sell it short and the market for 
borrowing stocks is not a centralized market. Therefore, according to Lamont and Thaler 
(2001), borrowing can be difficult and even impossible for many equities (stocks with low 
market capitalization for example). Illiquid stocks are also difficult to short.  
 
According to Lamont and Thaler (2001) arbitrage does not eliminate mispricing due to short 
sale constraints and this may cause momentum. Lamont and Thaler argue that shorting costs 
are extremely high or shorting may simply be impossible and therefore eliminating 
exploitable arbitrage opportunities which in turn may cause momentum. A defiance of the law 
of one price is the background for this statement. The driver of the law of one price is 
arbitrage, which give arbitrageurs the motivation to eliminate defiance of the law of one price. 
Arbitrageurs react to information which affects the fundamental value, but due to high 
shorting costs they do not act strongly enough to drive prices down to the right value. It is 
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important to note that short selling constraints do not explain overpriced stocks. To explain 
this, we need irrational players to bid up the prices beyond reasonable.  Hence, according to 
Lamont and Thaler, two primary issues emerge: both trading costs and irrational market 
participants are necessary for mispricing.  
 
According to Chan and Lakonishok (1995) average transaction costs for small firms are 
approximately 3% while Carhart (1997) estimate transaction costs to be around 0,95%. 
Lesmond Schill and Zhou (2001) find that there is little hold of transaction costs lower than 
1,5% for every transaction since a momentum strategy pick stocks with high transaction costs. 
In Norway, due to a illiquid market, there may exist an even larger spread than in the findings 
of Lesmond Schill and Zhou which built their work on Jegadeesh and Titman’s NYSE/AMEX 
research. 
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4. Previous Research 
Thus far, finding that either indicate that markets are inefficient or that we have an inaccurate 
asset pricing model. For example, findings of the momentum effect did not seem to be 
important until the 1980’s since the support of efficient markets stood strong in academic 
circles. In 1978, Jensen famously wrote “I believe there is no other proposition in economics 
which has more solid empirical evidence supporting it than efficient markets”. But then in the 
1980s, behavioral finance as an alternative approach to efficient markets was introduced. 
While the traditional approach was based on assumptions that individual participants in the 
market act rationally and utilize all available information, behavioral finance suggests that 
individuals does not act rationally, but are affected by a set of cognitive biases which leads to 
systematic errors and hence to suboptimal decisions (Shleifer 2000). In other words, 
behavioral finance helps explain why markets may not be efficient and consequently why 
prices in financial markets may not equal their fundamental value. Empirical evidence 
supporting this approach is found by amongst others DeBondt and Thaler (1985) and 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). 
 
4.1 Previous international research 
Some of the most important works concerning the momentum and mean reversal strategies 
are written by amongst others, Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), DeBondt and Thaler (1985) and 
Rouwanhorst (1998).  
 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) find that the profitability of buying stocks that have done well 
in the past and selling stocks that have performed poorly in the past (over three to twelve 
months holding periods) is not due to systematic risk or to delayed stock price reactions to 
common factors such as the January effect. The evidence Jegadeesh and Titman find is 
consistent with delayed price reactions to firm specific information. They find however, that 
these returns are decreasing over longer horizons and that the first month following the 
formation date, which means that they found evidence of mean reversion over longer horizons 
than one year and also the first month. 
 
Jegadeesh and Titman find that the best strategy selects stocks based on their return during the 
twelve previous months and then holds the portfolio for three months (J12:K3). When there is 
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no time lag between the formation period and the holding period this strategy yields a profit 
of 1.31% per month. 
 
Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) find that the momentum effect found in 1993 continued in the 
eight subsequent years, which they conclude provides some assurance that the momentum 
effect is not entirely a consequence of data mining. Also, they evaluate different explanations 
for the momentum effect and find evidence which supports the prediction of behavioral 
finance models which suggests that the momentum effect is due to overreactions in the market 
rather than the Conrad and Kaul (1998) hypothesis. 
 
DeBondt and Thaler (1985) examine whether or not stock markets overreact to unexpected 
and dramatic news events. They find that in accordance with the overreaction hypothesis that 
past losers tend to outperform past winners on a longer horizon (3-5 years), three years after 
the formation day DeBondt and Thaler find that past losers outperform past winners by as 
much as 25% even after adjusting for risk. In other words they find evidence of long time 
mean reversion. Their results also touch upon the January effect; they do not come up with a 
sufficent explanation for this effect, but find that portfolios of losers experience large January 
returns as late as five years after formation day. Further, their results support the price-ratio 
hypothesis that high price-earnings (P/E) stocks are overvalued and low P/E stocks are 
undervalued and that this effect is for the most part a Seasonality/January phenomenon.  
 
Rouwenhorst (1998) examines twelve European countries including Norway in the period 
from 1978 through 1995 using Jegadeesh and Titmans method from 1993. Rouwenhorst’s 
main findings are that an internationally diversified momentum portfolio earns about 1% per 
month. This momentum effect is significant on a 5% level in all countries, except Sweden. It 
holds for all size deciles, but he finds that especially the small firms yield excess momentum 
returns. The outperformance lasts for periods up to one year before prices starts to reverse. 
Further, he finds that the momentum effect cannot be attributed to risk, when controlling for 
market risk and exposure to a size factor, the excess return from following the momentum 
strategy actually increases. The excess return also increases with the ranking period (J) and 
falls for longer holding periods (K) and both the winners and losers, are on average, smaller 
than the average of the complete sample.  
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Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) analyze the Finnish stock market. They look at the behavior of 
various investor types and are primarily focused on which investor group reveals momentum 
behavior and which reveals the opposite. Grinblatt and Keloharju find that foreign, more 
sophisticated investors, tend to be momentum traders while domestic, less sophisticated 
investors, particularly households, tend to be reversal traders which means that they buy past 
losers and sell past winners. The degree of momentum behavior seems to be strongly 
correlated with the degree of sophistication of the investor types. They rank the various 
investors according to their degree of momentum behavior in the following descending order: 
1.  Foreign investors 
2.  Domestic nonfinancial corporations 
3.  Domestic Finance and insurance institutions   
4.  Government investors and nonprofit organizations 
5.  Households 
 
The foreign investors which tend to be well capitalized financial institutions such as mutual 
funds, hedge funds and investment banks are the most sophisticated and therefore according 
to Grinblatt and Keloharju most likely to trade on momentum. They also find that the 
portfolios of foreign more sophisticated investors tend to outperform the domestic investors 
even after controlling for behavioral differences.  
 
4.2 Previous Research on the Oslo stock exchange| 
In 2007 Harald Myklebust conducted a study whether there exists momentum in the 
Norwegian stock market over the period 1984-2006. Myklebust (2007) finds that all the 
sixteen different time strategies that he tested yielded positive returns. Further, he finds that 
the highest return was achieved by investing in the portfolio with a ranking period of nine 
months and a holding period of twelve months (J9:K12). The lowest return was achieved by 
investing in the portfolio with a ranking period of three months and a holding period of three 
months (J3:K3). All his returns were increasing in the holding period; the longer the holding 
period the higher the return, except for the portfolio with a ranking period of six months, 
which achieved the highest return after a holding period of nine months (J6:K9).  
 
Like Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), Myklebust finds that the strategy with a ranking period of 
twelve months and a holding period of 3 months (J12:K3) gives the highest monthly return, 
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yielding 2.21%. The only strategy which does not yield a return over 1% is the (J3:K3) 
strategy.  
 
Myklebust concludes that all strategies give significant positive returns, but not for all 
periods. The period from 1990 to 1994 did not yield significant returns. This is the period 
where the average return of the ten portfolios is lowest. Study of risk demonstrates that the 
winner portfolios which he names P1 always had a greater average market size than the loser 
portfolios, P10 and that the beta values were equal or marginally higher in the losing 
portfolios. He then concludes that the zero investment portfolios (P1 – P10) did not have any 
extra market risk or a higher share of small companies.  
 
In Kloster-Jensen’s 2005 study of momentum on OSE over the period 1996-2005, a 
momentum strategy which combines a long position in the winning portfolio combined with a 
short position in the losing portfolio is found to yield significant positive returns. According 
to Kloster-Jensen, there is reason to believe that stock returns are to a certain degree 
predictable.  His results also show that the momentum effect is stronger and lasts longer for 
the loser portfolios; it is the short selling of the loosing portfolios which generates the largest 
share of the momentum profit. 
 
Kloster-Jensen then adjusts for systematic risk and finds that the difference in systematic risk 
explains almost the whole momentum effect. Further he finds that the winner portfolios 
contain small stocks and stocks with a low book-to-market value (B/M) while the loser 
portfolios contain small stocks and stocks with a high B/M value. 
 
Kloster-Jensen concludes that abnormal returns from following a momentum strategy to a 
large extent are caused by compensation for taking on added systematic risk. 
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5. Data Material 
We first examine an extensive set of data two determine the degree of statistically significant 
momentum in the market, that is the theoretically possible excess return an investor could 
earn from being a momentum trader in the Norwegian market. In the second part of our study, 
“the best strategy portfolio”, we focus on possible economic benefits of following a 
momentum strategy. To maximize the robustness of our study we use two different sets of 
data when working towards these two different objectives. 
 
5.1 Large data sample to test the theoretical momentum effect 
Our data is collected from “Børsdatabasen” at the Norwegian School of Economics and 
Business Administration. The data available from Børsdatabasen stretches back to 1984, but 
at this time index data for Oslo Stock Exchange (we use Oslo Stock Exchange All-share 
Index, OSEAX) has not been verified as controlled and reliable and we have therefore been 
instructed to limit our data to contain observations from the start of 1996 (Helge Flataker, 
Børsprojektet at NHH, 2008). Also, the number of stocks available diminishes as we go back 
in time. Consequently our sample data spans from the beginning of 1996 to the end of 2007. 
This gives us a total number of 598 stocks during the period. Some of these stocks have only 
been listed during a relatively short period of time and some are illiquid and lack trading days. 
The lack of trading days might lead to serial correlation in portfolio returns. One way to 
overcome the problem of missing trading days is not to incorporate stocks in the study that 
lack observations during the period. This has been done in earlier research of momentum in 
the Norwegian stock market Kloster-Jensen (2005) and Myklebust (2007). However, this 
approach would leave us with no more than approximately 70 stocks. The numbers of stocks 
are important for two main reasons: first, in order to establish whether or not there is 
momentum present we want to have as many stocks as possible to choose from when forming 
our winner and loser portfolios. Second, to minimize the idiosyncratic risk we want the 
selected portfolios to contain as many stocks as possible. This is a balance between forming 
large portfolios with little idiosyncratic risk, but less evidence of momentum, or smaller 
portfolios with higher momentum but possibly more idiosyncratic risk. We therefore have 
chosen to work with all 598 available stocks. When constructing the winner and loser 
portfolios, all stocks with available returns data in the J month foregoing the formation date 
are included. This is in-line with the method used by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) and 
minimizes the problem with missing trading days while still allowing for a broader set of 
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observations. Also, if we only accounted for the 70 stocks that are being traded during the 
entire period, our results would be affected by “survivorship bias” (Elton and Gruber, 1996). 
Companies performing relatively poorly are more likely to generate extreme results by either 
going bankrupt or turning around their business. If we only kept the poor performers that 
managed to turn around their business and excluded the ones that went bankrupt, it would 
affect the result of our test. From a practical point of view, a trading strategy based on the 
results from a study that excludes observations from stocks that have not made it through the 
whole testing period would imply that investors could predict which stocks that would be de-
listed or not traded at all (Grundy & Martin, 1998).  
 
To obtain a solid set of observations without excess noise we have used monthly data. As our 
risk-free interest rate we have used the various NIBOR’s (Norwegian Inter Bank Offered 
Rate) that corresponds to our holding periods. That is, the three month NIBOR for portfolios 
with a three month holding period (K=3) and the six month NIBOR for portfolios with a six 
month holding period (K=6) and so on. We use generic adjusted stock prices: generic simply 
means that in case of missing observations the last known price is used. An adjusted stock 
price is a price that accounts for the fact that some changes in the price do not affect the real 
value to the investor. When calculating returns, one should use adjusted stock prices to 
measure the real change in value to the investor. The adjustments are transferred backwards 
so that the last adjusted price is equal to the nominal price. The stock prices are adjusted for 
dividends, splits and other events that dilute existing stocks. 
 
5.2 Dataset “best strategy portfolio” 
This part of the study is also based on the data from “Børsdatabasen” and the same rules of 
selection apply when we chose the time period to investigate, which consequently is the same 
as for the previous part. Again, we use monthly data and generic stock prices and the risk 
free-rate is the NIBOR corresponding to our holding periods. However, since we in this part 
of the study focus on the practical and economical implications of following a momentum 
strategy in the Norwegian stock market, we have a new set of selection criteria when picking 
the stocks to work with. We want to exclude the smallest and lowest priced stocks to secure 
that our results are not triggered mainly by illiquid and small stocks or by bid-ask bounces. 
Jegadeesh & Titman (2001) find, when examining NYSE and Nasdaq stocks, that the results 
are the same with or without a USD5 price screen except in the Januaries; “The low-priced 
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stocks exhibit large return reversals in January and, as a result, the momentum strategies earn 
larger negative returns in January if these stocks are included”. The data used for the “best 
strategy portfolio” have been filtered by the following conditions: 
• The market value must at all times exceed NOK10m  
• Close price must always exceed NOK10 
• The stock must have been traded for a minimum of three years 
This leaves us with a set of 123 stocks during the sample period spanning from the start of 
1996 to the end of 2007. 
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6. Methodology and models 
The methodology in our research is founded on previous studies by De Bondt & Thaler 
(1985), Jegadeesh & Titman (1993) and Jegadeesh & Titman (2001). The method aims at 
testing how well stock prices reflects available information and if there is an under or over-
reaction to new information. The results derived are a product of the model, and restricted by 
the limitations of the model.  
 
6.1 Methodology when testing for the theoretical momentum effect 
In the first part of the study our main focus was to determine if there was statistical proof for 
momentum in the Norwegian stock market, and if so, which theoretical abnormal returns one 
could earn by following a momentum strategy. We also touch on the matter of economical 
significance by adjusting for transaction costs. We further examine this topic in our “best 
strategy portfolio” section where we operate with another set of data. 
 
We use four time horizons called J during which the formation of the portfolios takes place 
based on the stock returns during these formation periods. J could be 3, 6, 9 or 12 meaning 
that the stocks are sorted during a 3, 6, 9 or 12 month period, we then buy the stocks that have 
had the highest returns and sell the once that have had the lowest returns and thereby establish 
portfolios. After the formation period follows the holding period called K, during which we 
hold the portfolios for 3, 6, 9 or 12 months. In total there are 16 individual J/K strategies 
formed by a formation period (J) and a holding period (K). Jegadeesh & Titman (1993) divide 
the stock market in deciles with the lowest past return decile being portfolio P1, the loser 
portfolio, and the highest past return decile being portfolio P10, the winner portfolio. Unlike 
Jegadeesh & Titman (1993) we have chosen to have a fixed number of stocks in every 
portfolio throughout the sample period even though the number of available observations 
varies over time. This is because we want to ensure that we have enough stocks to reduce 
idiosyncratic risk even in times of few observations. During the period from 1996 to the end 
of 2007, measured monthly, we had an approximate average number of 150 available 
observations of returns. Based on this we chose to always have 15 stocks in both the winner 
and the loser portfolio constituting approximately 10% each of the average number of 
observations. The portfolios inbetween the winner and the loser are not formed. The 
individual stocks included in the portfolios are equally weighted; we do not weight stocks 
relative to their market size. 
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We follow a “buy and hold” strategy were we buy the winner and sell the loser portfolio at the 
formation date and at the end of the holding period we terminate our holdings. At this point if 
J ≤ K we buy a new winner and sell a new loser based on the preceding formation period. If, 
on the other hand, J > K we wait for the formation period, initiated at the same time as our last 
holding period to end and then we start over with new portfolios. An alternative to this 
strategy would be to operate with overlapping portfolios. Overlapping portfolios would give 
us more observations but when following a strategy with overlapping portfolios one uses the 
same returns multiple times which may cause autocorrelation. Consequences of 
autocorrelation are similar to those of heteroscedasticity. The coefficient estimates derived 
using ordinary least squares linear regression model are still unbiased, but they are inefficient 
even at large sample sizes; the standard error estimates may be incorrect. In the case of 
positive autocorrelation the standard error will be biased downwards (and the t-values 
overestimated). This would lead to a tendency to reject the null hypothesis even when it is 
correct (Brooks, 2002). In our case, this can lead to a remarkably high momentum effect. 
We will however expand our tests to include overlapping portfolios when we further examine 
our “Best-strategy portfolio”.  
 
In order for a share to be considered for the holding period it needs to have returns available 
for all months of the preceding formation period. If a stock is delisted during the holding 
period, Jegadeesh & Titman (1993) invests the amount from the last available trade in the 
appropriate index. We have chosen a different approach when this problem occurs. We 
believe that stocks having outperformed the market during the formation period by such 
extent that they make it to the winner portfolio are less likely to disappear (during the 
following holding period) because of bankruptcy compared to stocks in the loser portfolio. 
Using the same argument, a stock having underperformed is less likely to be de-listed for a 
“positive reason” (e.g. acquired with a premium) compared to a member of the winner 
portfolio. Even though there might be exceptions to this theory, and albeit one could argue 
that we add to an eventual momentum effect by choosing this approach, we still believe that it 
is more correct to simply invest the amount from the last available trade in the next stock on 
the list. That is the stock with the sixteenth highest accumulated return during the formation 
period as replacement for a de-listed stock in the winner portfolio and the stock with the 
sixteenth lowest accumulated return as a replacement for a delisted stock in the loser 
portfolio, and so on. 
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Jegadeesh & Titman remove stocks with a market value that places them among the 10% 
smallest companies on NYSE and also stocks prices below USD5 at the time of portfolio 
formation. Since we are testing stocks listed on Oslo Stock Exchange we are dealing with 
fewer observations and therefore we wish to include all possible stocks. Our approach has 
several downsides such as the risk of the results being driven by illiquid stocks and large 
relative gaps between bid and ask prices. Therefore it should be viewed as a theoretical 
approach where the results might not be in line with what an actual investor could expect to 
achieve. The results that turn out to be statistically significant might not be economically 
significant.  
 
6.1.1 Excess return (on the risk­free asset and the OSEAX) 
All stocks selected for the portfolios are equally weighted regardless of their market share and 
price. We have calculated logarithmic returns because of its statistical advantages. 
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ݎ݅,ݐ is the monthly logarithmic return to stock i at  time t, and ݎ݉,ݐ is monthly logarithmic 
return to the market (measured as Oslo Stock Exchange All-share Index (OSEAX)) at time t. 
At the day of formation of the portfolios the stocks are sorted based on their cumulative return 
(cr) over the formation period J: 
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Then the return of a portfolio of equally weighted stocks can be calculated. The 15 stocks 
with the highest cr will constitute the winner portfolio (P=W) and the 15 stocks with the 
lowest cr will form the loser portfolio (P=L): 
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ܿݎ௉,௧ is the cumulative return of portfolio P at time t and N is the number of stocks in the 
portfolio (N=15).  
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Our first measurement of the portfolios return is against the market return. This is done by a 
non risk-adjusted model. We calculate the cumulative return to portfolio P ሺܿݎ௉,௄,௧) over the 
holding period K and also the cumulative market return ሺܿݎ௠,௄,௧) over the same period: 
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We then calculate the excess return for portfolio P on the market over the holding period K 
൫ܴܿ௣,௄,௧ ൯ by subtracting the cumulative market return for the same period K. 
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Next, we calculate the cumulative monthly excess return (cmR) for the whole period from the 
beginning from 1996 to the end of 1997 ܴܿ݉௉,௄,்: 
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The size of T depends on how many holding periods that fits into the whole period i.e. a 
function of J and K (when operating with overlapping portfolios, in the best strategy portfolio, 
T is the number of months during the whole sample period minus the first formation period of 
six month). Finally, when this process is carried out for both the winner portfolio (P=W) and 
the loser portfolio (P=L), we calculate our zero sum “winner-loser portfolio” (P=H) by 
subtracting the loser portfolio from the winner portfolio: 
ࢉ࢓ࡾࡴ,ࡷ,ࢀ ൌ ࢉ࢓ࡾࢃ,ࡷ,ࢀ െ ࢉ࢓ࡾࡸ,ࡷ,ࢀ 
 
The winner-loser portfolio is a zero-sum portfolio since we buy the winners and sell the 
losers, a long and a short position with the combined investment of zero. 
 
If the market is efficient on the weak-form stock prices already reflect the information in 
historic price- and turnover data which stipulates a null hypothesis saying that any given 
portfolio of ours has a cumulative monthly excess return equal to zero. If, on the other hand 
there is a positive autocorrelation in the returns any given portfolio of ours will have a 
cumulative monthly excess return different from zero. 
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ࡴࡻࡼ: ࢉ࢓ࡾࡼ,ࡷ,ࢀ ൌ ૙ 
ࡴ࡭ࡼ: ࢉ࢓ࡾࡼ,ࡷ,ࢀ ് ૙ 
 
If the latter is the case our winner portfolio will have a cmR greater than zero and our loser 
portfolio will have a cmR less than zero and the winner-loser portfolio, shorting the loser and 
buying the winners, will have a cmR greater than zero, i.e. the hypothesis for the winner-loser 
portfolio will be: 
ࡴࡻࡼ: ࢉ࢓ࡾࡴ,ࡷ,ࢀ ൌ ૙ 
ࡴ࡭ࡼ: ࢉ࢓ࡾࡴ,ࡷ,ࢀ ൐ 0 
 
To test our hypothesis we follow the lead of Jegadeesh & Titman and use the t-test. The t-test 
assess whether the mean of two groups are different from each other (statistically different). 
The t-value that we present in the results is the coefficient divided by its standard error. The 
ܴଶ, presented in some results, is the coefficient of determination adjusted for degrees of 
freedom. 
 
As explained in earlier chapters one should bear in mind that to conclude that markets are not 
efficient in the weak form one needs to operate with a perfect market equilibrium model i.e. 
market efficiency cannot really ever be rejected. 
 
6.1.2 Risk­adjusted performance 
Our second test accounts for risk when measuring the momentum effect. The most common 
risk adjusting model is the CAPM and this is also the first model that we will use in this part 
of our study. Investors are usually said to be risk averse, they need to be compensated for the 
time value of money and for risk. In the CAPM the time value of money is represented as the 
risk free rate which is the return an investor will be given over a period of time on a 
theoretical risk-free investment. The investor also demands compensation for any non-
diversifiable risk that he takes on. Diversifiable risk, or idiosyncratic risk as it is also called, is 
firm-specific and can be diversified away by spreading the investment on several securities 
and for that reason the investor will not be compensated for bearing this kind of risk. The non-
diversifiable risk on the other hand can be thought of as external factors that affects the whole 
market such as macro shocks or business cycles i.e. factors that cannot be eliminated by 
spreading the investment on several securities. Different assets will be more or less sensitive 
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to this kind of market risk and should yield a return thereafter. The CAPM measures the non-
diversifiable risk by the beta coefficient (β) which is the sensitivity of the asset’s return to the 
markets return. The market beta is one; an asset beta of more than one indicates that the 
particular asset fluctuates more than the market and vice-versa.  
ࢼࡼ,࢓ ൌ
࡯࢕࢜ሺ࢘ࡼ, ࢘࢓ሻ
ࢂࢇ࢘ሺ࢘࢓ሻ
 
 
The CAPM equation: 
ࡱሺ࢘ࡼሻ ൌ ࢘ࢌ ൅ ࢼࡼ,࢓ሺࡱ൫࢘࢓ሻ െ ࢘ࢌ൯ሻ 
 
࢘ࡼ is the return of portfolio P, ࢘ࢌ is the risk-free rate and ࢘࢓ is the market rate of return. The 
difference between the expected market rate of return and the risk-free rate is known as the 
market premium or the risk premium.  
 
To estimate whether a portfolio has earned an abnormal return, that is, an extra return 
compared to the theoretically suitable rate of return determined by CAPM, we add a new 
measurement known as Jensen’s alpha (α).  
ࢻࡼ ൌ ࡱሺ࢘ࡼሻ െ ൫࢘ࢌ ൅ ࢼࡼ,࢓ሺࡱ൫࢘࢓ሻ െ ࢘ࢌ൯ሻ൯ 
 
With some alterations to this expression we can estimate the performance by regression 
analysis, where ࢿࡼ,࢚ is an observational error, also known as noise: 
࢘ࡼ,࢚ െ ࢘ࢌ,࢚ ൌ ࢻࡼ ൅ ࢼࡼ൫࢘࢓,࢚ െ ࢘ࢌ,࢚൯ ൅ ࢿࡼ,࢚ 
 
The null hypothesis is; ܪܱ: ߙ ൌ 0 and the alternative hypothesis will be ࢻࢃ ൐ 0 for the 
winner portfolio, ࢻࡸ ൏ 0 for the loser portfolio and for the winner-loser portfolio; ࢻࡴ ൐ 0. 
Like Jegadeesh & Titman (1993) we extend our test of risk-adjusted performance to include 
an adjustment for size or more specifically small minus big, SMB. We have on the date of 
formation sorted all stocks based on their market cap in ascending order and calculated 
accumulated logarithmic returns from the formation period J (calculations same as above). 
Observations are created by dividing these returns at the median and subtracting the half with 
“big” market capitalization from the half with “small” market capitalization, consequently we 
end up with observations based on small minus big stocks by market capitalization. In the 
regression this shows up as a new factor in a two-factor model: 
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࢘ࡼ,࢚ െ ࢘ࢌ,࢚ ൌ ࢻࡼ ൅ ࢼࡼ൫࢘࢓,࢚ െ ࢘ࢌ,࢚൯ ൅ ߛࡼሺࡿࡹ࡮࢚ሻ ൅ ࢿࡼ,࢚ 
 
The null hypotheses and the alternative hypotheses will be the same as for the risk-adjusted 
one factor model above. 
 
6.2 Best strategy portfolio 
As our best strategy portfolio we have chose the J6K6-strategy. In the results we will show 
that this actually isn’t the portfolio that earned the highest cumulative monthly return 
(compare J9K6) but it is the strategy most thoroughly examined by some of our predecessors 
and therefore provides the opportunity of comparison with earlier research. In this part of the 
study, our focus shifts from testing the Norwegian stock market for statistical proof of 
momentum to actually proving whether or not it is economically feasible to follow a 
momentum strategy. 
 
We operate with a new set of data and to examine the robustness of the momentum effect we 
extend our test of risk-adjusted performance to include a third factor; book-to-market value 
(i.e. the Fama and French three factor model). Now, we form portfolios both using 
overlapping formation and holding periods as well as non-overlapping periods as before. 
Overlapping formation means that every month a new formation period starts and overlapping 
holding means that every month we terminate a portfolio that we have held for the past six 
month and form a new portfolio based on the past six-month formation period results. 
Consequently, we hold several portfolios at all times, rebalancing every month by terminating 
one portfolio and forming one portfolio. The winner portfolio and the loser portfolio are 
formed using the ten best performing stocks and the ten worst performing stocks respectively. 
We have decreased the number of stocks in every portfolio since the total dataset contains 
fewer stocks. The downside with this is that by having fewer stocks in a portfolio we are more 
exposed to idiosyncratic risk. 
 
In this part of the study we start of by presenting descriptive data in order to uncover patterns 
among the actual stocks that have made it to the winner and loser portfolios. We check 
whether any sectors are over or underrepresented among winners or losers. 
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The method for testing for momentum, without risk adjustments, is the same as for the 
previous part and so is the first risk-adjusting test, the CAPM. Out third test however, differs 
from the previous part. Here we use a three factor model developed by Fama & French 
(1993). This model ads a factor to our previous two-factor model. Third factor adjusts for 
book-to-market ratio, HML. HML is a differential portfolio created by dividing the list of 
stocks at the median sorted by the stocks book-to-market value. The portfolio is formed by 
buying stocks with a high book-to-market value (so called value stocks) and shorting stocks 
with a low book-to-market (so called growth stocks). The factor measures the historical 
excess return for value stocks over growth stocks, HML stands for high minus low. The rest 
of the terms in the below expression are equal to the two-factor model earlier described. 
࢘ࡼ,࢚ െ ࢘ࢌ,࢚ ൌ ࢻࡼ ൅ ࢼࡼ൫࢘࢓,࢚ െ ࢘ࢌ,࢚൯ ൅ ࢽࡼሺࡿࡹ࡮࢚ሻ ൅ ࣅࡼሺࡴࡹࡸ࢚ሻ ൅ ࢿࡼ,࢚ 
 
Furthermore, we analyze sub periods. Based on the performance of the overall market, we 
identify business cycles during our test period and then test the momentum for boom and bust 
periods individually.  
 
We have also added to the robustness by testing for seasonality through a closer examination 
of the January returns in our data sample. This is done by excluding the returns from January 
months from one set of portfolios and excluding the returns from all months except January 
for another set of portfolios. 
 
Our final study is founded on previous research by Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) on the 
behavior of different investor types. We calculate moving averages excess returns for 
different durations to discover eventual trends in momentum over time when following the 
J6K6 strategy. We do the same monthly moving calculations for the t-value to better grasp the 
significance of the returns. Then we compare our results to the development in investor types 
on the Oslo Stock Exchange during the time period.   
 
 
 
 
38 
 
7. Results 
The results are presented in accordance with the objectives of their respective tests. First, we 
look at the theoretical excess return derived from our large data sample of 598 stocks. In the 
second part of the results, “the best strategy portfolio” we scrutinize the economic gains that 
an investor could earn from being a momentum trader in the Norwegian market. Here we also 
present descriptive data and the evidence we have found on seasonality, trends and more.  
 
7.1 Results from testing for theoretical momentum (598 stocks) 
7.1.1 Raw returns 
From Table 1 it can be seen that every winner-loser portfolio yields a positive return, every 
strategy however, is not statistically significant at a 5% level. Therefore we cannot with 95% 
certainty reject the null hypothesis. We observe however, that nine of our portfolios yield 
significant excess positive returns relative to the benchmark while the other seven portfolios 
also yield positive return although not significant at a 5% level. Therefore we conclude that it 
appears to be profitable to follow a momentum strategy in the Norwegian market. This agrees 
with the conclusions of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) although they find that every portfolio 
except from the J3:K3 portfolio is statistically significant.  
 
Table 1 
 
 
J K 3 6 9 12
3 Sell loser ‐0,07703 ‐0,20327 ‐0,24286 ‐0,11771
‐2,58 ‐4,61 ‐3,58 ‐0,64
3 Buy winner 0,00593 ‐0,11998 ‐0,01223 ‐0,01525
0,31 ‐1,42 ‐0,21 ‐0,10
3 Winner ‐ loser 0,08297 0,08330 0,23063 0,10246
2,95 0,909 3,69 1,29
6 Sell loser ‐0,06651 ‐0,12789 ‐0,22983 ‐0,10185
‐1,19 ‐3,71 ‐4,24 ‐0,85
6 Buy winner 0,01086 0,05109 0,08039 ‐0,03757
0,23 1,43 1,09 ‐0,57
6 Winner ‐ loser 0,07737 0,17898 0,31022 0,06427
2,53 3,78 4,62 0,43
9 Sell loser ‐0,16729 ‐0,26571 ‐0,20178 ‐0,18675
‐2,80 ‐4,72 ‐1,72 ‐1,45
9 Buy winner ‐0,06811 ‐0,01393 ‐0,02102 0,02584
‐1,75 ‐0,19 ‐0,29 0,19
9 Winner ‐ loser 0,09918 0,25178 0,18076 0,21259
1,58 3,23 1,50 1,42
12 Sell loser ‐0,02327 ‐0,12110 ‐0,10901 ‐0,17980
‐0,66 ‐4,19 ‐1,65 ‐1,68
12 Buy winner 0,08509 0,05148 0,08113 ‐0,02482
1,98 1,15 1,12 ‐0,40
12 Winner ‐ loser 0,10836 0,17259 0,19014 0,15497
2,85 2,93 2,23 1,23
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It is the loser portfolio that generates most of our momentum profit, while our loser portfolios 
yield between -2.33% (J12:K3) and -26.57% (J9:K6) our winner portfolios yields between  
-12% (J3:K6) and 8.5% (J12:K3). From our table we also see that the loser portfolios t-values 
are a great deal higher than the winner portfolios t-values. Eight loser portfolios are 
statistically significant while there are no significant winner portfolios. To exploit this it is 
necessary to short sell these losing stocks which may be costly and even impossible to realize 
so this may not be economically feasible. These findings agree with Hong, Lim and Stein 
(2000) and Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) which also find that most of the momentum effect is 
generated by the loser portfolios.  
 
We see from the same table that the winner-loser portfolio that are based on the background 
of a ranking period of six months with a holding period of nine months (J6:K9) yield the 
highest return of 31.02% over the nine month holding period. This strategy is significant as 
well with a t-value of 4.62. Not surprisingly, we also see that returns increase with the holding 
period in the portfolios that are statistically significant. The J6:K3 portfolio is the portfolio 
that yields the lowest statistically significant return of 7.73%, with a t-value of 2.53.  
 
According to Chan and Lakonishok (1995) average round trip transaction costs for small 
firms are approximately 3 % while Carhart (1997) estimate round trip transaction costs to be 
around 0.95%. Since The Oslo Stock exchange is comprised of more “less liquid” and smaller 
stocks, and since the investors are fewer, which implies that the market might be less efficient 
compared to large international markets such as the NYSE and Nasdaq, we have decided to 
assume a round trip transaction cost of 4% when working with the sample of all 598 stocks. 
This is fairly high, but considering the arguments above, and that we have to short sell the 
losing stocks, we find it reasonable. If we review the results above with this insight we find 
that the winner-loser portfolio yielding the lowest return (the J6:K3-portfolio) with a 
statistically significant return of 7.73% is no longer statistically significant after adjusting for 
transaction costs with a return of 3.57% after 3 months (t-value 1.17). Our best performing 
portfolio (the J6:K9-portfolio) yields a return of 31% over the nine months holding period 
before adjusting for transaction costs and a 26.4% significant return (t-value 3.93) after 
adjusting for transaction costs. In total, after adjusting for transaction costs we have four 
portfolios which still yield significant returns; the other five are still positive. We conclude 
that although transaction costs take away some of the profit it does not take away all of our 
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excess returns. These results differ from Carhart (1997) which concludes that transaction costs 
takes away the excess returns from following a momentum strategy.  
 
It might also be interesting to compare the monthly returns, depicted in Table 2: 
 
Table 2 
 
 
We see from this table that J9:K6 performs best with a significant positive return of 3.82%. 
While J12:K3 and J6:K9 yield the second and third highest returns respectively. Jegadeesh 
and Titman (1993) and Rouwenhorst (1998) find that J12:K3 which we rank as our second 
best portfolio is the most profitable strategy, while Kloster-Jensen (2005) finds that the the 
J6:K6-portfolio yields the highest profit. Similar to Kloster-Jensen, we find that it is more 
profitable to hold the portfolios for a short horizon, in other words, the lower the holding 
period the higher the monthly return. This can be interpreted as a sign of long time reversal. 
These findings are consistent with the findings of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) which suggest 
that a behavioral model rather than the Conrad and Kaul (1998) hypothesis explains 
momentum. This is because behavior models of overreaction predict long time reversals, 
while the Conrad and Kaul hypothesis predicts that the profits from the momentum strategy 
should be equally positive in any subsequent period. 
 
Adjusted for transaction costs our top performing monthly return portfolio (J9:K6) yields an 
excess return on the market of 3.2% per month. Our worst performing portfolio (J12:K9) 
yields a return of 1.5% which is not statistically significant.    
 
J K 3 6 9 12
3 Winner ‐ loser 0,0269 0,0134 0,0233 0,00816
2,95 0.909 3,69  1.29 
6 Winner ‐ loser 0,0252 0,0278 0,0305 0,0052
2,53  3.78 4.62  0.427 
9 Winner ‐ loser 0,032 0,0382 0,01863 0,0162
1,58 3,23 1,5  1.42
12 Winner ‐ loser 0,0349 0,0269 0,0195 0,0121
 2.85 2.93 2,23  1.23
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7.1.2 Adjustment for market risk ­ CAPM 
In this section we want to test whether the momentum effect found in the previous chapter is 
still present after adjusting for systematic risk using the capital asset pricing model CAPM.  
 
Table 3 shows a ranking period of three months and we see that none of the winner alphas, 
three of our loser alphas, and two of our winner–loser alphas are significant.  
 
Table 3 
 
 
Table 4 show a ranking period of six months, and the outcome of the alphas in terms of 
significance are the same as in Table 3, with three month ranking periods, except that we find 
one more strategy with a significant winner-loser alpha; that is the portfolio with the six 
month holding period.  
 
J=3 K =  3 6 9 12
α 0.00668866 ‐0.0675808 ‐0.0502998 0.00922738
t‐value 0.335 ‐0.788 ‐1.07 0.0549
β 1.03576 1.40283 1.62056 0.770132
t‐value 6.12 2.46 8.36 1.23
R^2 0.45463 0.22328 0.84309 0.142945
α ‐0.0644267 ‐0.155402 ‐0.276103 ‐0.0469676
t‐value  ‐2.23 ‐3.93 ‐4.38  ‐0.231
β 1.59702 1.62475 1.54189 0.335740
t‐value 6.53 6.17 5.93 0.441
R^2 0.486266 0.644497 0.730273  0.02119
α 0.0711154 0.0878211 0.225803 0.0561950
t‐value 2,61 0.931 3.38 0.679
β ‐0.561265 ‐0.221922 0.0786714 0.434392
t‐value  ‐2.43 ‐0.353 0.285 1.40
R^2 0.116419 0.00590196 0.00622714 0.179472
Winner
Loser
Winner ‐ Loser
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Table 4 
 
 
For a ranking period of nine months, presented in Table 5, none of our winners, three of our 
losers and two of our winner–loser alphas are significant.  
 
Table 5 
 
 
Our last risk-adjusted table, Table 6, with a ranking period of twelve months tells us that none 
of our winner, two of our loser and three of our winner–loser alphas are significant. 
 
J=6 K =  3 6 9 12
α 0.00664728 0.0453385 0.0498965 ‐0.0504876
t‐value 0.157 1.35 0.695 ‐0.710
β ‐0.103369 1.45314 1.49719  1.13995
t‐value ‐0.246 6.62 5.06 4.79
R^2 0.00286551 0.676042 0.663168 0.717881
α ‐0.0701558 ‐0.136513 ‐0.263561 ‐0.182441
t‐value ‐1.32 ‐5.02 ‐5.89 ‐1.81
β 0.0457550 1.67969 1.54995 1.87326 
t‐value 0.0870 9.43 8.40 5.55
R^2 0.000360033 0.808976 0.844408 0.774188
α 0.0768031 0.181852 0.313457 0.131954
t‐value 2.46 3.79 4.36 0.881
β ‐0.149124 ‐0.226558 ‐0.0527586 ‐0.733307
t‐value ‐0.483 ‐0.721 ‐0.178 ‐1.46
R^2  0.0109707 0.0241263 0.00243084 0.191906
Winner
Loser
Winner ‐ Loser
J=9 K =  3 6 9 12
α  ‐0.0204513 0.0425182 0.0134506  0.0542753 
t‐value  ‐0.571 0.588 0.187 0.360
β  2.17517 1.51605 1.44866  1.55505 
t‐value 3.60 3.70 4.90  1.47
R^2 0.4988 0.5136 0.6484  0.1528
α ‐0.122583  ‐0.209356  ‐0.242704 ‐0.171974
t‐value ‐2.10 ‐3.93 ‐4.34  ‐1.19
β  1.48433  1.52742   1.67771    1.79306
t‐value 1.51  5.06  7.29  1.78
R^2 0.1490 0.6636 0.8033 0.2087
α  0.102132 0.251874 0.256154  0.226250
t‐value 1.55  3.11  2.57 1.33
β  0.690837 ‐0.0113700   ‐0.229051  ‐0.238004 
t‐value 0.622  ‐0.0248 ‐0.559 ‐0.200
R^2 0.0289 0.0000 0.0234  0.0033
Winner
Loser
Winner ‐ Loser
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Table 6 
 
 
If we first review our alphas we find that none of our winner alphas are significant, while ten 
of our 16 loser alphas are significant and also ten of our winner-loser alphas are significant. If 
these risk-adjusted alpha values reported above are significantly positive it means that their 
respective portfolios have done better than the expectations according to the CAPM. On the 
other hand, if these risk-adjusted alpha values are significant negative it means that their 
portfolios have performed worse than what was expected according to the CAPM. We can 
therefore conclude that the loser portfolios are performing better than their expectations 
although not for every portfolio. The winner portfolios however are not significant; hence we 
cannot say whether or not they perform better than their expectations derived from the CAPM 
model. 
 
Of our 16 winner-loser portfolios ten are significant on a 5% level and all alphas are positive. 
The alpha values have actually increased in twelve out of 16 portfolios which means that the 
excess return from following a momentum strategy increase when we adjust for systematic 
risk. We observe from Table 1, before we adjusted for systematic risk using the CAPM 
model, that the same winner-loser portfolios are significant except for J9:K9 which become 
significant positive first after we adjust for systematic risk. This indicates that the momentum 
effect is still very much present after adjusting for systematic risk. These results are similar to 
those of Rouwenhorst (1998) which studied the European market, he also finds that the excess 
J=12 K =  3 6 9 12
α  0.0857865 0.0549521 0.0696686   0.0236642
t‐value 1,9 1.02 0.965 0.352
β  0.858970 0.938962 1.31800  1.18701
t‐value  1.41 2.04 4.70 5.28
R^2  0.1802 0.3162 0.7104  0.7556
α ‐0.0235483 ‐0.151649 ‐0.123926  ‐0.171372 
t‐value ‐0.636 ‐5.45 ‐2.04  ‐1.71
β  1.05514 1.53742   1.41393   1.62109 
t‐value 2,11 6.48 5.99 4.84
R^2 0.3312 0.8234 0.7995  0.7222
α 0.109335 0.206601  0.193594  0.195036 
t‐value 2,74 3.08  2.14 1.47 
β  ‐0.196169 ‐0.598455   ‐0.0959320   ‐0.434079 
t‐value ‐0.364 ‐1.05 ‐0.273  ‐0.977 
R^2 0.0145 0.1086  0.0082 0.0958
Loser
Winner ‐ Loser
Winner
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return from following a momentum strategy actually increase after adjusting for systematic 
risk.  
 
We find that all the betas for the loser portfolios except three are higher than the betas of the 
winner portfolios; hence the loser portfolio is more exposed to market risk. This difference is 
not statistically significant. Since the difference is not significant we cannot say that the 
momentum return from holding the winner-loser portfolio is due to differences in systematic 
risk (beta). Our conclusion that the momentum effect is not due to systematic risk is in line 
with the conclusion of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). In contrary to our study Jegadeesh and 
Titman (1993) find that the winner portfolios are more exposed to market risk, although not 
statistically significant.    
 
The winner portfolio betas are positive for every strategy but J6:K3, and significantly positive 
for every strategy except J3:K12, J6:K3, J9:K12 and J12:K3. This means that the winner 
portfolios tend to fluctuate in the same direction as the market. We see a tendency for the 
betas to increase with the holding period for all ranking periods except for the ranking period 
of nine months where it has a tendency to decrease. 
 
The loser portfolio betas are significant for every strategy except J3:K12, J6:K3, J9:K3 and 
J9:K12 and all the betas are positive. This means that all the loser portfolios fluctuate in the 
same direction as the market. As for the winner betas, we also observe a tendency for the loser 
betas to increase with the holding period. What’s more is that we see that the loser portfolios 
have larger betas in general than the winner portfolios which clearly indicate that the loser 
portfolios are more exposed to market risk?  
 
The beta coefficients of the loser portfolios are higher than the betas of the winner portfolios 
in every strategy except for J3:K9, J3:K12 and J9:K3, this means that 13 out of 16 winner-
loser portfolios have negative betas. This suggests that the majority of our winner-loser 
portfolios fluctuate against the market. However, only one of the winner-loser betas, the 
J3K3-beta, is significantly different from zero at a 95% confidence interval. 
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7.1.3 Two ­ Factor model  
In this part we adjust for two factors; market risk as we did above and also a size factor, the 
SMB which denotes small minus big. In Table 7 we present the two-factor model returns with 
a ranking period of three months.  
 
In Table 7 and Table 8 our results are very similar to the alphas and the betas adjusted only 
for systematic risk by the CAPM model that we presented earlier. Our SMB coefficients 
however are only significant for one winner–loser portfolio in Table 7, the J3:K3, and none of 
the winner loser portfolios in Table 8. This may be due to a lower number of observations for 
every holding period except for the three months holding period. 
 
Table 7 
 
 
J=3 K =  3 6 9 12
α 0.0156202 ‐0.0820918  ‐0.0663721  0.0219569
t‐value 0.758 ‐0.867 ‐1.12  0.100 
β1  1.08915 1.39658 1.65029  0.784352
t‐value 6.59 2.47 7.24 1.16
SMB  1.07970  ‐0.193131 0.379552  0.0116821 
t‐value 1.74 ‐0.632 0.450  0.0569 
R^2 0.498282 0.237405  0.84436   0.158752
α ‐0.0599913 ‐0.183384 ‐0.252494  ‐0.0151775
t‐value ‐2.32  ‐4.27 ‐3.46 ‐0.0573 
β1 1.76039  1.52476   1.73408  0.345151
t‐value 8.49  5.95  6.19  0.423
SMB  3.31980 0.186643 1.50716  0.00801477
t‐value  4.27  1.35  1.45  0.0323 
R^2  0.644791 0.66395 0.775953   0.0248528
α 0.0756115 0.101292  0.186122   0.0371344
t‐value  2.83 0.995 2.30  0.348 
β1  ‐0.671234 ‐0.128178  ‐0.0837889 0.439201 
t‐value ‐3.13 ‐0.211 ‐0.269  1.34 
SMB ‐2.24010 ‐0.379774  ‐1.12761 0.00366737 
t‐value ‐2.79 ‐1.16 ‐0.980 0.0367
R^2 0.253528  0.0677159 0.0781859  0.197817
Winner
Loser
Winner ‐ Loser
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Table 8 
 
 
We observe the same tendency with very similar alphas and betas to the systematic risk-
adjusted results in Table 9 as we did in Table 7 and 8. The J9:K3 portfolio has the only 
significant winner – loser SMB coefficient similar to what we observed in Table 7. 
Table 9 
 
J=6 K =  3 6 9 12
α 0.0605175  0.0167712 0.0770307  ‐0.0572561 
t‐value  1.10 0.442  0.899   ‐0.416
β1 ‐0.00436040 1.47219 1.65140   1.15283
t‐value ‐0.0101 6.97 4.99 4.02 
SMB  0.461632 ‐0.391887  1.28623   0.00790760 
t‐value 0.579  ‐0.757 1.05  0.00573
R^2  0.0165198  0.159635 0.698221 0.736054
α ‐0.0146522 ‐0.152124 ‐0.284431 0.0226967 
t‐value  ‐0.215  ‐4.89  ‐5.09  0.132
β1  0.174965 1.65689 1.52266 2.14194
t‐value  0.327 9.57  7.07 6.01
SMB 0.683357  0.286513  ‐0.0615117  2.87239
t‐value  0.693  0.675  ‐0.0771   1.67 
R^2  0.0295598 0.822625  0.848967   0.830258
α 0.0412472  0.168896  0.361462  ‐0.0799528
t‐value  0.387 3.07 4.24  ‐0.289
β1  ‐0.109217 ‐0.184698  0.128732  ‐0.989111 
t‐value  ‐0.305  ‐0.604 0.391  ‐1.72 
SMB  1.64916  ‐0.678399  1.34774   ‐2.86448
t‐value 0.416 ‐0.906 1.11 ‐1.03
R^2  0.0258956 0.0580362 0.0950015 0.27082
Winner
Loser
Winner ‐ Loser
J=9 K =  3 6 9 12
α ‐0.0132780 0.0673008  0.0346814 ‐0.0183974
t‐value  ‐0.331 0.696 0.448  ‐0.102 
β1  2.02646 1.48958  1.35665 1.47473
t‐value 3.31 3.62  4.68 1.50
SMB 0.0125692  0.436329 0.0224577   ‐1.04769 
t‐value 0.0123 0.361 0.680  ‐0.767 
R^2 0.479072  0.54075 0.675578 0.217196 
α ‐0.0704525 ‐0.153302  ‐0.245363  ‐0.122242 
t‐value ‐1.60  ‐2.27  ‐4.08 ‐0.712
β1 2.21172  1.58105  1.65437  1.92222 
t‐value 3.30  5.50 7.34   2.04
SMB 3.82461 1.05958  ‐0.00998034  0.689051
t‐value 3.41 1.25 ‐0.388  0.528 
R^2 0.630971  0.719612  0.822101  0.281319 
α   0.0571746  0.220602  0.280045  0.103844 
t‐value 0.965 2.06 2.64 0.532 
β1  ‐0.185264 ‐0.0914744  ‐0.297720 ‐0.447498 
t‐value ‐0.205 ‐0.201 ‐0.750 ‐0.419
SMB ‐3.81204  ‐0.623254  0.0324380 ‐1.73674 
t‐value ‐2.52  ‐0.465 0.717 ‐1.17
R^2  0.34658 0.0177731 0.068513  0.1107
Winner
Loser
Winner ‐ Loser
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Table 10 which show a ranking period of twelve months is no exception and the numbers here 
are also very similar to the CAPM adjusted returns. Here, three out of four winner–loser 
alphas are statistically significant on a 5% level just like in Table 6 for the systematic risk-
adjusted returns. As with a ranking period of three and nine months also the ranking period of 
twelve month only has a significant SMB coefficient for the three month holding period. 
 
Table 10 
 
 
Summed up the tables above show that nine out of our 16 winner-loser portfolios are 
statistically significant on a 5% level, and every winner-loser portfolio except from J6:K12 
are positive. This suggests as our previous tests did, that there is a momentum effect in the 
Norwegian market.  
 
Our beta coefficients for the winner and loser portfolios are mostly similar to those in the 
CAPM adjusted results. In other words the betas derived from our CAPM test are similar to 
those derived from the two factor model; hence our exposure to systematic risk is fairly 
similar measured with the two different models. Further, our winner-loser portfolio betas are 
still not significant except from the J3:K3-strategy. This tells us that the momentum effect is 
not explained by adjusting for systematic risk. We therefore conclude that the profitability of 
the strategy is not a compensation for systematic risk. 
J=12 K =  3 6 9 12
α 0.118611  0.0529878  0.0709086  0.00982450 
t‐value  2.45  0.973  0.802  0.129
β1  1.23818 0.925936  1.31574  1.21691 
t‐value 2.32 2.30 2.72  5.13 
SMB 2.55916  ‐0.632054  0.158490   ‐0.309814 
t‐value  1.47 ‐0.818 0.0807 ‐0.394 
R^2  0.415696  0.450685   0.724392 0.778021 
α ‐0.0321385 ‐0.150878 ‐0.147060  ‐0.151980
t‐value ‐0.729  ‐5.30  ‐2.03  ‐1.35
β1  0.995063  1.47973  1.20970  1.51414 
t‐value 2.04  7.03  3.05  4.32 
SMB  ‐0.619210 0.176555 ‐0.891020   0.757374
t‐value ‐0.391 0.437  ‐0.554 0.652
R^2 0.428175  0.861323 0.822006  0.744016
α 0.150749 0.203866  0.217969   0.161804
t‐value  4.14  3.02  2.01   1.09 
β1  0.243112 ‐0.553797 0.106037 ‐0.297228
t‐value 0.604 ‐1.11  0.178 ‐0.642 
SMB  3.17837  ‐0.808609  1.04951  ‐1.06719 
t‐value  2.43 ‐0.843 0.435   ‐0.696
R^2  0.43186  0.17752 0.0341182 0.140901
Winner
Loser
Winner ‐ Loser
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Our winner-loser portfolio SMB coefficients however are not as easy to interpret, six of our 
SMB coefficients are positive while ten are negative. Only three winner-loser portfolio 
coefficients are statistically significant on a 5% level, two are negative and one is positive. 
The low significance levels for the SMB coefficient and high positive significance levels for 
the alphas indicate that the SMB factor does not explain the momentum effect which is in line 
with the results of amongst others Rouwenhorst (1998). The negative SMB coefficients 
indicate that most of the winner-loser portfolios will react positive when large companies 
outperform small companies. 
 
A low ܴଶ tells us that the model used does not explain much of the momentum effect. We 
have a rather low ܴଶ for the winner–loser portfolios. The ܴଶ varies from 1% to 43%. On 
average however this is higher than the ܴଶ derived from the CAPM model. This implies that 
the two factor model explains excess returns from following a momentum strategy better than 
the CAPM, but none of the models provide a very high degree of explanation. 
 
7.2 Best strategy portfolio 
7.2.1 Descriptive data (sector analysis) 
Before presenting the momentum strategy results we have tried to identify and illustrate any 
over or underrepresentation from different sectors in our portfolios. It would have been 
interesting to test for momentum when following a strategy where one buys the sector that 
have had the highest past returns and shorts the sector with the lowest past returns. However, 
our sample of 123 stocks doesn’t fully allow us to perform such a test since some sectors 
comprise over 20% of the total sample of stocks while others include less than 2% of the 
stocks, i.e. there would be a bias towards the sectors comprising more stocks when forming 
winner and loser portfolios, especially since our portfolios include ten stocks each or almost 
10% of the total number of stocks.  
 
111 stocks end up in the winner portfolio at least once and 103 stocks end up in the loser 
portfolio at least once during the sample period. In total 114 stocks from the total sample of 
123 stocks either makes it to the winner or the loser portfolio one or more times during the 
sample period.  
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Table 11 shows the ten sectors defined by the Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS), 
used by Oslo Børs (Oslo Børs 2008), and their representation in our sample of stocks and our 
winner and loser portfolios. From the original data of 123 stocks (from Børsdatabasen) only 
115 stocks have been sector classified. This is because the only information we have on the 
remaining eight stocks is a ticker, and unfortunately these tickers no longer exist. More than 
half of the 115 companies have been de-listed and for these companies we have done the 
sector classification ourselves, analogous to the GICS.  
 
Some sectors stand out among the winner and loser portfolios. Financials are 
underrepresented on both the winner and the loser sides, implying that this sector is less 
volatile than the average sector. Energy and Information Technology (IT) are sectors that 
more often than average shows up among the winners, especially energy with an 
overrepresentation of 6.3%, as shown by the “Diff”-column (calculated as “%winner” minus 
“%total”). The loser portfolios tend to favor healthcare stocks and IT-stocks. The latter has a 
percentage representation difference compared to the whole sample by as much as 9.3% and 
is also a frequent inhabitant of the winner portfolio, implying that the sector is relatively 
volatile and also a relatively bad performer. However, almost half of the appearances of IT-
stocks in the loser portfolio occurred during the bust-period also known as the IT-crash, a two 
and a half year period from the end of 2000 to the first quarter of 2003. In other words if we 
were to exclude this period from the sample the IT-shares would still be overrepresented in 
the loser portfolios, but to a less extent.  
 
Table 11 
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7.2.2 Raw returns 
From Table 12 we see that the J6K6-overlapping portfolio has an excess return on the market 
of approximately 4% over the holding periods in average, and this is statistically significant. 
The excess return is mainly derived from the short positions while the winner portfolio’s 
excess return is low but positive which is in accordance with our previous findings and also 
the findings of Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) and Kloster-Jensen (2005). From an economic 
perspective we wish to determine if this strategy can be used in practice to earn a profit. Since 
we now operate with a dataset screened for small and illiquid stocks (i.e. stocks that will 
inflict lower transaction costs and that with greater ease can be shorted) we base our estimate 
for a round-trip transactions cost on Carharts (1997) estimates of 1% and add an “Oslo Stock 
Exchange premium” of 0.5%. This gives us a round-trip transactions cost of 1.5%.  After 
transaction costs of forming and terminating the portfolio we are left with an excess return of 
approximately 3% over the six month period or a 0.5% excess return per month. 
 
Table 12 
 
 
The non-overlapping portfolio has the same tendencies and an excess return somewhat above 
the previous result, but none of the alphas are significantly different from zero.  
 
Table 13 
 
 
7.2.3 Adjustment for market risk – CAPM 
The results are similar to the previous non risk-adjusted test, but the excess return has actually 
increased which is consistent with our findings in the theoretical part. The Beta coefficient to 
the winner-loser portfolio is negative which implies that the portfolio moves in the opposite 
direction to the benchmark, but since it is not significantly different from zero we conclude 
N=127 Winner Loser Winner‐Loser
α 0.00470707 ‐0.0355166 0.0402237
t‐value 0.487 ‐2.79 2.38
t‐prob 0.6273 0.0061  0.0189α
N=22 Winner Loser Winner‐Loser
α 0.00117718 ‐0.0455038 0.0466810 
t‐value 0.0648 ‐1.56 1.23
t‐prob 0.9490 0.1332 0.2318α
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that market risk does not explain the excess return of the winner-loser portfolio which is 
similar to our previous findings and to the findings of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) and 
Myklebust (2007).  
 
From the ܴଶ we also see that the movements of our winner-loser portfolio hardly at all is 
explained by the movements in the Benchmark while for the winner and loser portfolios 
around 70% of the variability is explained. The winner portfolio has a small but positive 
alpha, but it is the negative excess return of the loser portfolio that contributes the most to the 
winner-loser portfolios result. Adjusting for transactions cost we are left with an economic 
profit of approximately 3.15% over the six month holding period or an annualized gain of 
6.3%. 
 
Table 14 
 
 
Similar to the non risk-adjusted test we see the same tendency for the non-overlapping and the 
over-lapping tests, but again we have no statistically significant excess returns. However with 
a t-prob of 16% we have a winner-loser portfolio excess return, adjusted for market risk, 
which measures almost 6% over a six month period.  
 
Table 15 
 
 
N=127 Winner Loser Winner‐Loser
α 0.00764630 ‐0.0388544 0.0465007
t‐value 0.761 ‐2.94  2.65 
t‐prob 0.4480 0.0040 0.0091 
β 0.942762 1.06500  ‐0.122239
t‐value 17.6   15.1  ‐1.31
t‐prob 0.0000 0.0000  0.1925
R^2 0.713455 0.646864  0.0135484
CA
PM
N=22 Winner Loser Winner‐Loser
α 0.00451702  ‐0.0536627 0.0581797
t‐value 0.233 ‐1.74 1.46
t‐prob 0.8184 0.0968 0.1609 
β  0.938136  1.15113  ‐0.212991
t‐value 8.48  6.56  ‐0.936 
t‐prob 0.0000  0.0000  0.3604
R^2 0.782576  0.682858 0.0419663
CA
PM
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7.2.4 The Fama French Three factor model 
When adjusting for Fama’s and French’s three factors we get an excess return for the winner-
loser portfolio of 7.67% over the holding period which is an increase compared to when we 
only adjust for market risk exposure. These findings are similar to our previous findings and 
those of Rouwenhorst (1998) who finds that excess return from following a momentum 
strategy increase after controlling for market risk and exposure to a size factor. We find a 
monthly increase of approximately 0.25% comparable to that of Rouwenhorst (1998) of a 
little over 0.3% per month. Again the largest contribution comes from the loser portfolio, but 
the winner portfolio has a positive return though not significantly different from zero. The 
market risk coefficient is significantly different from zero for all three portfolios so the market 
risk does explain some of the excess return of the momentum trading strategy. The SMB 
coefficient is significant both for the loser portfolio and the winner-loser portfolio and does 
explain some of the excess return of the winner-loser portfolio. It seems that the loser 
portfolio is comprised of relatively small stocks and that it will react positive when small caps 
outperform large caps, also in line with the findings of Rouwenhorst (1998). The opposite 
goes for the winner-loser portfolio which has a short position in the loser portfolio.  
 
We have no significant results from adjusting for book-to-market values. However tendencies 
of the coefficients imply that both the winner portfolio and the loser portfolio have an 
overweight of value stocks compared to growth stocks. The effect is larger for the loser 
portfolio which we short; hence the winner-loser portfolio has a negative HML factor, though 
not significantly different from zero. An adjustment for transaction costs would leave us with 
a profit of approximately 12.25% annually or slightly above 1% a month, given the six month 
holding period.  
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Table 16 
 
 
For the non-overlapping portfolios only the beta coefficients for the winner and loser 
portfolios are significantly different from zero on a 5% significance level. However the alpha 
for the loser portfolio is significantly negative on a 10% level and the SMB Coefficient is also 
significant on the 10% level, implying that there is an overweight of small caps in the loser 
portfolio. Again we see a positive alpha for the winner-loser portfolio of almost 7%.  
 
Table 17 
 
 
We cannot explain the momentum effect neither by the CAPM nor by the three factor model. 
Instead we have findings of higher excess returns when adding more “explanatory” variables 
to our model. As mentioned earlier Fama (1991) argue that market efficiency is not testable 
N=127 Winner Loser Winner‐Loser
α 0.00829941 ‐0.0684411   0.0767405
t‐value 0.756 ‐5.37 4.29 
t‐prob 0.4514  0.0000 0.0000
β 0.946774  1.25826  ‐0.311487
t‐value 15.5  17.8 ‐3.13
t‐prob 0.0000  0.0000 0.0022 
SMB ‐0.111621 6.82728 ‐6.93890
t‐value ‐0.113 5.97  ‐4.32 
t‐prob 0.9100 0.0000 0.0000
HML 0.641639  0.858059  ‐0.216421 
t‐value 0.666  0.767 ‐0.138
t‐prob 0.5067 0.4444 0.8906 
R^2 0.714529 0.726747 0.143682
FF
3F
N=22 Winner Loser Winner‐Loser
α 0.00374939 ‐0.0660248   0.0697742 
t‐value 0.175 ‐1.97  1.59 
t‐prob 0.8631 0.0640 0.1285 
β 0.900214  1.22560 ‐0.325390
t‐value 6.82 5.95  ‐1.21
t‐prob 0.0000 0.0000  0.2435 
SMB ‐0.612470 2.90655 ‐3.51902
t‐value ‐0.328 0.996  ‐0.921 
t‐prob 0.7469 0.3323 0.3690
HML ‐1.20122  ‐0.738852  ‐0.462368 
t‐value ‐0.737  ‐0.291  ‐0.139
t‐prob 0.4704  0.7747  0.8911
R^2 0.789475  0.702638 0.0851203
FF
3F
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unless one has an accurate equilibrium model. Since we can’t consider our models to be 
perfect equilibrium models the overall conclusion when adjusting for Fama and French’s 
three factors is that our results seem to be objectives of the Joint-Hypothesis problem. 
  
7.2.5 Seasonality 
Previous research has documented a significant seasonality in momentum profits. Jegadeesh 
and Titman (1993 and 2001) reports that winners outperform loser in all month except 
January, when the losers significantly outperform the winners.  
 
Our findings are in line with the ones of Jegadeesh and Titman. When forming portfolios over 
a six month ranking period and holding the portfolios for the subsequent six month our 
winner-loser portfolio earns an excess return of approximately 4.85% or 9.70% annually. The 
returns of the loser and the winner-loser portfolio are significantly different from zero at the 
5% level, while the winner portfolio has a return close to zero. 
 
Table 18 
 
 
The next table shows the January returns, based on a six month ranking period. The loser 
portfolios significantly outperform the winners resulting in a negative excess return of the 
winner-loser portfolio of almost 6.8% per month, significant at the 10% level. One should 
note that the test contains few observations (N=10). 
 
Table 19 
 
 
N=126 Winner Loser Winner‐Loser
α ‐0.00462169 ‐0.0530815 0.0484598
t‐value ‐0.492 ‐4.42 3.07
t‐prob 0.6234 0.0000 0.0026
All month except january
α Seasonality
N=10 Winner Loser Winner‐Loser
α ‐0.00705245 0.0608940 ‐0.0679465
t‐value ‐0.397 2.51 ‐1.89
t‐prob 0.7009 0.0332 0.0915
Only January
α Seasonality
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7.2.6 Business Cycles 
Figure 1 shows the development in the benchmark (the OSEAX) over the sample period. We 
want to investigate the variation in momentum returns during business cycles. The first period 
we have defined ranges from 1996 to 2001. It’s neither a boom nor a bust period, but more a 
period of two booms and one bust. The reason we have chosen not to further divide this 
period in three is that it would result in rather few observations per period. The second period 
is a bust period, the “IT-crash”, stretching from 2001 to 2003 and the third and last period is 
the boom covering the rest of our main sample period.  
 
Figure 1 
 
 
During the first period we see results, though not significantly different from our earlier 
findings. The winner portfolio follows the same pattern as before but the loser portfolio has 
outperformed, even compared to the winner portfolio. Consequently the winner-loser 
portfolio shows signs of reversal (a negative alpha, but far from significant) on behalf of the 
loser portfolio.  
 
Table 20 
 
 
100
200
300
400
500
600
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
OSEAX
N=54 Winner Loser Winner‐Loser
α 0.0154401 0.0204180  ‐0.00497792
t‐value 0.999 1.02 ‐0.196 
t‐prob 0.3223  0.3101 0.8451
α Business 
Cycles
1996‐07‐31‐‐2000‐12‐29
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The second period, the bust period, is more in line with the results from the test for the whole 
sample period with a positive but not significant alpha for the winner portfolio and a negative 
and significant alpha for the loser portfolio. The excess return of the winner-loser portfolio is 
statistically significant and slightly above 6% for the six month holding period, about 1.5% 
more than for the whole sample period. 
  
Table 21 
 
 
The last period, the boom period, shows a trend by further increasing the winner-loser alpha. 
This time around we get a significant excess return of more than 8% for the holding period, 
even though the winner alpha is slightly negative. It’s the bad performance of the loser 
portfolios during this period that adds to the positive winner-loser result.  
 
Table 22 
| 
 
To fully evaluate if there are any variations to the momentum effect in good times and bad 
times we have calculated a one year moving average for the winner-loser portfolio alpha (the 
average alpha over a twelve month period, moving one month ahead every month) and a one 
year moving average of the logarithmic returns to our benchmark, the OSEAX, plotted 
together in figure 2. An interesting fact is that we see dramatic reversals from holding our 
portfolios in the two periods subsequent to the two bust periods (the circled areas, also 
compare figure 1 for the basic index), where the alpha turns negative. According to Conrad 
and Kaul (1998) if risk exposure is the explanation to the positive excess returns of 
momentum strategies the profits from a momentum strategy should be the same in any post 
N=25 Winner Loser Winner‐Loser
α 0.0168821 ‐0.0449349  0.0618170
t‐value 1.32  ‐2.12  2.29 
t‐prob 0.1997  0.0449  0.0311
α Business 
Cycles
2000‐12‐29‐‐2002‐12‐30
N=50 Winner Loser Winner‐Loser
α ‐0.0108723 ‐0.0953026 0.0844303
t‐value ‐0.644 ‐5.00 2.83
t‐prob 0.5226 0.0000 0.0067 
α Business 
Cycles
30.12.2002‐31.01.2007
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ranking period, in other words there should be no reversals. Our findings are more in line with 
the behavioral theory of overreaction.  
 
Figure 2 
 
 
7.2.7 Trends and investor types 
From previous studies by Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) we know that the degree of investor 
sophistication is strongly correlated to the degree of momentum behavior. In our study of sub 
periods we have already seen evidence of a trend with increasing momentum profits during 
the sample period and we wish to check whether trends in the degree of momentum in the 
Norwegian market is correlated to the relative owner distribution and trade distribution among 
investor types.  
 
Again we calculate a moving average for the excess return, the alpha, to the momentum 
strategy. To smooth the returns and get a better graphical illustration of a possible trend we 
calculate a four year average alpha, moving monthly. This means that the graph starts four 
years into our sample period (30.06.2000) and ends at the end of our sample period 
(30.01.2007). We have also calculated a four year moving average t-value, depicted in the 
graph. We clearly see a positive trend in the excess return to the momentum strategy. The 
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graph shows that an investor following the momentum strategy for a four year period 
sometime between 2001 and 2007 would earn a significantly (compare a t-critical of 2) 
positive excess return at the 5% level of between approximately 6% and 9% per six month 
holding period. Accounting for transactions costs the investor would earn an excess return of 
between 9% and 15% annually.  
 
Figure 3 
 
 
Next we want to examine whether there has been a transformation in the types of investors 
that trades on the OSE during this time period. An increased relative portion of trades in the 
Norwegian stock market attributable to institutional and foreign more sophisticated investors 
could be a possible explanation of the trend, in the sense that an increase in the share of 
momentum traders probably would amplify the actual momentum effect. The relationship 
between momentum traders and the momentum effect could also be the other way around; the 
more sophisticated investors could be drawn to markets where momentum exists and in a 
market with a positive trend in momentum we would accordingly see a positive trend in the 
share of momentum traders.  
 
The figure depicts the ownership distribution of listed companies on the OSE between various 
groups of investors from January 2001 to January 2008. The upper graph of the figure shows 
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the percentage owner distribution and the lower graph shows the ownership distribution in 
billions of NOK (VPS 2008). We see that foreign investors have increased their share of the 
ownership over the years from 2002, with between 5% and 10%. While their ownership 
amounted to no more than 200bn NOK in 2001 it is now worth around 800bn NOK. Private 
company’s share of the ownership has remained relatively stable over the whole period while 
private investors have seen a decrease in percentage ownership. “Central and local 
government”, defined by Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) as in-between institutional and 
private investors in the degree of sophistication, has increased their share from 2001 but 
measured from a high at the beginning of 2003 their share has decreased with approximately 
10%. 
 
Figure 4 
 
 
Figure 5 shows statistics from VPS (2008) which illustrates the percentage share of the value 
of the trades at OSE where at least one partner is a foreign brokerage has increased. This 
might further strengthen our theory of a change in the trading pattern due to changes in 
relative magnitude of different investor groups.  
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Figure 5 
 
We believe that the share of foreign and institutional investors in the Norwegian market 
contributes to the momentum effect and that the increase in these groups of more 
sophisticated investors over the years helps explain the trend that we have discovered. 
However, as discussed above there are other possible explanations behind the cause-effect 
relation between momentum and investor types. From earlier empirical findings and from 
behavioral theories we know that momentum is supposed to be higher in small stocks. In this 
part of the study we operate with a dataset screened for small and illiquid stocks, but still see 
this positive trend in momentum. This further ads to our theory that a greater presence of 
momentum traders (i.e. foreign and institutional investors) adds to the momentum effect in the 
market, since these investor types usually trades stocks that are surrounded by relatively much 
information and are easier to value, i.e. stocks with relatively large market capitalization. This 
is contrary to the conservatism theory which predicts underreaction in the market. Instead 
these findings are more in line with other behavioral theories such as the availability bias 
which predicts overreaction in the market. If the assumption that an increase in the share of 
momentum traders actually adds to the momentum effect is correct it could help explain why 
momentum has not disappeared after becoming known to investors, as has happened with 
many other anomalies. 
 
We stress that these findings are only circumstantial evidence and further research must be 
done to infer a conclusion and determine a proper cause-effect relation. 
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8. Summary and conclusions 
This paper documents trends in stock returns in the Norwegian Market during the period 
between 1996 and 2007. A winner-loser portfolio generated from buying past winners and 
selling past losers outperforms the market by as much as 3.8% monthly. When accounting for 
microstructure influences, such as transaction costs and difficulties with short selling, we 
estimate that a portfolio held for six months subsequent to a six month forming period will 
earn an excess return on the market marginally higher than 1% per month. The largest 
contribution comes from the loser portfolio; the winner portfolio has a positive return, but not 
significantly different from zero. 
 
Our results indicate that the excess returns on the market from momentum trading are not due 
to systematic risk, nor are they explained by company size or book-to-market ratios. 
However, loser portfolios tend to load up on small stocks resulting in a winner-loser portfolio 
that is likely to react positively when large stocks outperform small stocks. Tests of 
seasonality confirm that the loser portfolio significantly outperforms the winner portfolio in 
Januaries while the winner portfolio significantly outperforms the loser portfolio during the 
rest of the year. 
 
Descriptive analyses of the underlying suggest that certain sectors are under or over-
represented in the loser and winner portfolios, while others rarely produce returns that put 
them in either the top or the bottom decile. Variation between sectors is likely to result in part 
from triggers that are unique to the particular time period being investigated. Further studies 
over longer time horizons are needed to draw certain conclusions on the features and 
magnitude of momentum variance across sectors. 
 
By studying business cycles and tendencies in momentum returns during different holding 
periods we find evidence that contradicts Conrad and Kaul (1998) who argue that excess 
returns from momentum trading arises from cross-sectional differences in expected returns 
rather than any predictable time-series variation in stock returns. Our findings show a decline 
in the excess return over the holding periods and evidence of reversals following bust periods. 
These results are in line with behavioral theories of overreaction.   
 
Foreign and institutional investors, defined by Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) as momentum 
traders, have increased their ownership of securities listed on the OSE between 2001 and 2008 
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and a larger share of the value of trades can be attributed to foreign brokerages during the 
same time period. There is also an apparent positive trend in momentum profits during our 
sample period. This gives us reason to believe that momentum traders add to the momentum 
effect, which if true could explain why the momentum effect has not disappeared after being 
recognized by investors. The positive trend in momentum returns and its noticeable parallel to 
the presence of different types of investors and their trade patterns further strengthens 
overreaction as a plausible explanation of the momentum effect. However, the cause-effect 
relationship of investor types to momentum needs to be explored in greater detail to solidify 
conclusions; it remains a topic for future research.    
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